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5  Smith’s philosophy and economic methodology
Sheila C. Dow
Introduction
Adam Smith is a towering fi gure in the history of economic thought. While he was by 
no means the fi rst to develop many of the ideas which underpinned the development of 
modern economics, nevertheless it is often the case that earlier thinkers are discussed in 
terms of the extent to which they anticipated Smith, or more directly infl uenced him. 
While others, such as Quesnay and Hutcheson, for example, developed ideas on the 
functioning of the macroeconomy and value respectively, there was something distinc-
tive about the way in which Smith put his ideas together and communicated them which 
made such an impact on the development of economics. The purpose of this contribution 
is to put the focus on Smith’s distinctive approach to economic methodology.
Just as Smith developed others’ economic ideas, his methodology too has its own 
history. Smith’s philosophical background, notably the Scottish Enlightenment and the 
work of his friend David Hume, is something I will explore fi rst in order to understand 
the basis of his methodology. I will draw on his essay on the ‘History of Astronomy’ 
(Smith, 1795; hereafter HA), his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Smith, 1762–63; 
hereafter LRBL) and the Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, 1759; hereafter TMS), 
for evidence of the philosophical background on which Smith drew. I will then consider 
three particular aspects of his methodology which arise from this philosophy: the ana-
lytical historical approach; the notion of system; and the nature and role of principles.
The nature of Smith’s infl uence on the development of modern economics has been 
coloured by the ways in which his work has been interpreted. In particular, Smith has 
been widely seen as the inspiration for general equilibrium theory (Arrow and Hahn, 
1971), an interpretation which has increasingly been challenged (for example by Winch, 
1997). The possibility is explored in the concluding section that a signifi cant element of 
such interpretive diff erences is methodological, including a lack of appreciation for the 
distinction between theory formulation and rhetoric.
Before I proceed, there is a refl exive need to be explicit about the interpretive approach 
being adopted in this chapter. The analysis of Smith’s methodology owes much to the 
seminal work of Andrew Skinner (notably 1965, 1972, 1996). The particular historio-
graphic approach that I adopt, further, is consistent with the Scottish historical approach. 
It has been developed most fully in modern discourse by Quentin Skinner (1969, 1988), 
who advocates a focus on the context of the author, and the author’s intentions within 
that context. Thus the exploration of Smith’s philosophical background is seen as a way 
of understanding why Smith approached his economic enquiries in the way that he did, 
as well as to understanding his methodology. It is to this exploration that I now turn.
Philosophical underpinnings
Smith’s philosophical background in the Scottish Enlightenment is the subject of a vast 
literature (see most recently Broadie, ed., 2003). Here I attempt only to draw out those 
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features which seem to be of greatest relevance to Smith’s methodology: those which 
infl uenced Smith’s understanding of science, and those which infl uenced the emerg-
ing character of economics as a moral science. The infl uence of his mentors Francis 
Hutcheson and David Hume is evident throughout.
Scottish Enlightenment philosophy was the outcome of a range of infl uences within 
a particular context. Scotland’s political distance from England until the Union of 
Parliaments in 1707 had encouraged strong connections with continental Europe. This 
had in turn encouraged the introduction of ideas from the Continent, both formally as a 
result of attendance at universities (such as Paris and Leiden), and informally, as a result 
of the convention of the European Tour.
But the blend of infl uences emerged as a distinctive philosophy in Scotland. This can 
be understood partly as a response to the needs of a small, relatively cohesive, society 
in the process of commercialization, grappling with the practical problems posed by 
new opportunities for economic development. In particular the union with England and 
the opening up of new territories in Central and North America created new trading 
opportunities, and thus a spur to capitalize on Scottish inventiveness. But in addition, 
the union with England posed challenges to the idea of Scottish nationhood and the 
involvement of Scottish thinkers in politics. Finally, there was an ongoing struggle for 
supremacy between Catholicism and Presbyterianism, which further raised issues of 
authority. Overall this context meant that practical issues were to the fore, and these 
were addressed with a perspective which had naturally absorbed a sense of ‘otherness’; it 
was impossible for example, in adapting to the new political arrangements with England, 
not to be conscious that there was more than one perspective to be brought to issues, 
each of which could claim legitimacy. This was to foster a distinctive attitude to what was 
possible for science in terms of discovering truth.
Hume (1739–40 [1978]) took on the challenge addressed by the French Enlightenment 
of building a complete philosophy founded on reason. But he concluded that this was 
impossible without some proof of existence. While there were diff erences between Hume 
and the commonsense philosophy of Thomas Reid (1785 [1969]), both placed importance 
on belief derived from experience. For Reid, common sense was taken to mean some-
thing more than simply what is commonly known. It involved rather the argument that 
the mind brings an additional capacity to observation than the fi ve senses. For Hume, 
belief in existence was a prerequisite for all knowledge, in particular being prior to 
reason. A theory of human nature was thus the foundation on which knowledge was to 
be built. He drew on natural law philosophy to identify belief (and conventions, includ-
ing morals, more generally) as the outcome of a historical process. Common sense was 
thus to prove a key element of his philosophy, and in turn for Smith (Comim, 2006).
Hume’s epistemology thus derived from his theory of human nature, with his empha-
sis on the human faculties of sentiment (or passion) and imagination, and their product, 
sympathy. These are required as the basis for building knowledge, together with experi-
ence; only then could reason be applied. The subject matter of science is too complex 
for us to be able to identify real causal mechanisms. But we have a starting point in that 
detailed observation of constant conjunctions of events gives us (through our imagina-
tions) the idea of cause. We then bring this idea to our further observation, in order to 
begin to hypothesize about causation. These ideas are evident in Smith’s study of the 
science of astronomy in HA, where he analyses the motivation for science (‘philosophy’) 
M2040 - YOUNG TEXT.indd   101 19/10/09   12:22:07
102  Elgar companion to Adam Smith
in terms of identifying a system for connecting the chains of events which we observe: 
‘Who wonders at the machinery of the opera-house who has once been admitted behind 
the scenes? In the Wonders of nature, however, it rarely happens that we can discover so 
clearly this connecting chain’ (HA II.9).
Since we cannot directly access the underlying causal powers, no hypothesis about 
the real world can be demonstrated to be true. It followed that science could not be an 
exercise in uncovering truth in any absolute sense. Nevertheless practical (provisional) 
knowledge is possible, and indeed is necessary when addressing the practical problems 
of a nation facing new challenges and opportunities. There is scope for argument as 
to whether some knowledge is more or less true, but no mechanism for settling on an 
 absolute judgement on the matter.
According to Smith, the motivation for the development of new knowledge itself arises 
from human nature. A sense of unease (‘surprise’ and ‘wonder’) is created by experience 
which is in discord with accepted knowledge. The mind becomes accustomed to par-
ticular conjunctions and is surprised when one event is not accompanied, as expected, 
by another. Drawing on his theory of human nature, and in particular the power of the 
imagination, Smith (HA) argues that what is being sought is the tranquility of mind 
which comes from a system of thought which incorporates the new, disturbing, experi-
ence in a satisfactory manner, where what is satisfactory may be determined by aesthetic 
judgement as much as by reason and experience. When the conjunction of two events 
which has caused a sense of unease is connected by a chain of imaginary intermediate 
events, then the mind is set at rest.
It is important that these intermediate events are grasped by means of the imagina-
tion. Thus the concept of gravity may satisfy our psychological needs and appeal to our 
imaginations, but this does not make it ‘true’ in any absolute sense. Further, the new 
explanation must be plausible; thus, for example, the notion of planetary motion applied 
to the earth was initially regarded as implausible until an explanation was off ered which 
connected with experience, such as Descartes’s theory of fl uxion (even though it whould 
later be displaced as a satisfactory explanation). Also, what is plausible to one may not 
be plausible to another. Smith contrasts the wonder experienced by an outside observer 
of an artisan’s work, on the one hand, with the easy familiarity with a sequence of events 
which seems ‘natural’ to the artisan himself, on the other (HA II.11). Further, the scien-
tist may be attracted more than others to novel explanations. In discussing Copernicus’s 
reluctance to put forward his new ideas, Smith refers to ‘that love of paradox, so natural 
to the learned, and that pleasure, which they are so apt to take in exciting, by the novelty 
of their supposed discoveries’ (HA IV.34). This is contrasted with the ‘natural preju-
dices of sense, confi rmed by education’ which Copernicus would have feared from his 
 audience (HA IV.35).
What ultimately persuades others that a new theory is satisfactory is a matter of 
rhetoric; if theories could not be demonstrated to be true, then some other criteria must 
be applied (LRBL). Smith discussed rhetoric as an exercise in persuasion, as one of the 
methods of discourse. Again his approach was psychological; persuasion required that 
an argument be tailored to the audience, and make some connection with what was 
already taken as known. Further, Smith noted that attention to aesthetic criteria, such as 
elegance and simplicity, as well as the portrayal of a system, might persuade regardless 
of other criteria for accepting an argument (Comim, 2006). While, as we shall see further 
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below, Smith did not share Descartes’s deductivist methodology for formulating theory, 
he could nevertheless understand the psychological appeal of his work.
It gives us a pleasure to see the phaenomena which we reckoned the most unaccountable as 
deduced from some principle (commonly a wellknown one) and all united in one chain . . . We 
need not be surprised then that the Cartesian Philosophy . . . tho it does not perhaps contain 
a word of truth . . . should nevertheless have been so universally received by all the Learned in 
Europe at that time. The Great Superiority of the method over that of Aristotle . . . made them 
greedily receive a work which we justly esteem one of the- most entertaining Romances that has 
ever been wrote. (LRBL, p. 146)
Smith recognizes further that consciousness of the psychological, more than rational, 
basis for accepting or rejecting theories does not protect the philosopher from his own 
psychology:
[E]ven we, while we have been endeavouring to represent all philosophical systems as mere 
inventions of the imagination, to connect together the otherwise disjointed and discordant 
phaenomena of nature, have insensibly been drawn in, to make use of language expressing the 
connecting principles of this one, as if they were the real chains which Nature makes use of to 
bind together her several operations. (HA IV.76, emphasis added)
Indeed, even within a discussion of the appeal of theories to the imagination, Smith had 
earlier implied that the Newtonian explanation for planetary motion had uncovered the 
‘real’ causal mechanism: ‘Thus the eclipses of the sun and moon, which once, more than 
all the other appearances of the heavens, excited the terror and amazement of mankind, 
seem now no longer to be wonderful, since the connecting chain has been found out 
which joins them to the ordinary course of things’ (HA II.10).
This self-awareness on the part of Smith with respect to the central role of the imagina-
tion, and thus of psychology, in the rhetorical power of theoretical explanation is impor-
tant for our understanding of Smith’s later exposition of his economic ideas. It is even 
more important for the way in which they have been interpreted. I will develop below 
more fully the argument that an understanding of the role of rhetoric is critical to our 
understanding of Smith’s methodology with respect to systems and the role of principles. 
It is important to consider separately the psychology of the philosopher, the method of 
building knowledge, and the psychology of the philosopher’s audience.
Finally, Smith’s major work in moral philosophy, TMS, off ered a fuller expression of 
his theory of human nature, showing the infl uence of Hutcheson (Skinner, 2006). It was 
here that some germs of Smith’s ideas on economics were fi rst aired in print. Here he dis-
cussed the individual’s self-interest in the context of society, and specifi cally the concept 
of sympathy (which he drew from Hume) as the mechanism by which society constrains 
individual behaviour. Here we see the roots of economic questions being pursued by the 
building up of a moral science (see further Young, 1997).
Further, just as the scientist does not have access to truth, neither does man in general 
(indeed Smith makes a point of arguing in HA that there is no fundamental diff erence, 
other than inclination and subsequent specialization, between the philosopher and 
others). Indeed man is capable of self-deception as to the consequences of his actions. 
Smith illustrates the point by discussing ‘the poor man’s son, whom heaven in its anger 
has visited with ambition’ (TMS IV.1.8). Here we have an example of the workings of 
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the invisible hand, a theme much more clearly evident in TMS than in WN. The invis-
ible hand is a metaphor to capture the unintended consequences of human action, given 
the human incapacity to anticipate these consequences correctly. As Heilbroner (1986, 
p. 60) puts it: ‘The Deity, when he created the world, gave to humankind a surer guide 
than reason. This was the call of its passions.’ While the poor man’s son is deceived in 
thinking that riches are the basis for happiness, his eff orts to amass riches have the for-
tunate externality of generating growth in the economy. The faculty of imagination and 
the sentiment of the pursuit of happiness, combined with the human incapacity to know 
the future, can in turn provide a reasonable psychological explanation for self-deception. 
Thus Smith shows the limited role of the faculty of reason in an explanation of human 
behaviour, just as he (and Hume) showed the limitations to its role in science.
It is against this background of Smith’s philosophy that I turn now to consider how 
this translated into the way in which he analysed economic questions.
Methodology
Analytical history
The way in which philosophy and science were used in Scottish society refl ected both the 
nature of practical concerns and the nature of the education system (which undoubtedly 
were not independent factors). Students entered higher education in their early teens 
(Smith was 14 when he entered the University of Glasgow; Hume had entered university 
at age ten), and were exposed early to moral philosophy, which then provided a common 
background to the pursuit of all other subjects. Further, these subjects were approached 
from a historical perspective (Davie, 1961). Thus, for example, rather than learning only 
one mathematical system, students learned about a range of approaches to mathematics 
adopted over history.
This conventional historical perspective in Scottish education is thus clearly a refl ec-
tion of the same philosophical background that I discussed above as providing a foun-
dation for Smith’s views on science and rhetoric. Knowledge was seen as being built 
using approaches which are psychologically appealing (in the light of prior conventional 
knowledge and experience), and no one approach could be demonstrated to be superior 
to others in any absolute sense. Further, the standards of judgement were relative to 
context. Thus it was important to be aware of a range of possibilities in order to form a 
view as to which was preferable in a particular context. (Indeed it can be argued that it 
was this which fostered the remarkable inventiveness of the period.)
This historically contingent approach to scientifi c knowledge is most evident in 
Smith’s (HA) account of evolving ideas on astronomy. He discusses the growing search 
for scientifi c explanation rather than superstition (or reference to the actions of ‘invisible 
beings’) as society evolves beyond subsistence and with more order and security (HA 
III.3). What constitutes a satisfactory scientifi c explanation then itself evolves. In consid-
ering the sequence of ideas on astronomy, Smith discusses what we would now refer to 
as ‘paradigm shifts’ in the understanding of the physical workings of the universe, with 
an awareness of the context in which each understanding was sustained. In this histori-
cal account we fi nd many of Smith’s methodological views (especially about system, and 
the role of principles) made explicit, which I will explore further in the following two 
sections.
M2040 - YOUNG TEXT.indd   104 19/10/09   12:22:08
Smith’s philosophy and economic methodology   105
Against this background, it was therefore not surprising that Smith’s approach to 
economics should also be historical, drawing on a massive range of examples from dif-
ferent times and places. The Scottish approach to science is often labelled ‘empiricist’ 
in direct contrast to French ‘idealism’. But this is misleading, not least because of the 
commonsense view that additional capacities of the mind, drawing on past experience, 
are brought to observation. But more important, rather than being seen as mutually 
exclusive, in the Scottish approach, observation and analysis were complementary. Here 
we see the profound infl uence of Newton’s experimental philosophy on the Scottish 
approach to science. Newton’s experimental methodology was to combine analysis and 
synthesis: ‘analysis consists in making Experiments and Observations, and in drawing 
general Conclusions from them by Induction . . . Synthesis consists in assuming the 
Causes discover’d, and establish’d as Principles, and by them explaining the Phaenomena 
proceeding from them’ (Newton, 1979 [1704], pp. 404–5). Newton’s scientifi c method 
of analysis and synthesis was fi rst fully absorbed, applied and promoted in Scotland, 
notably by MacLaurin (1748). This method combined induction and deduction within 
one epistemological system, both being essential elements. It is notable that, in contrast 
to its ready reception in Scotland, Newton’s philosophy of science was not well received 
in France, with its deductivist Cartesian tradition. As Montes (2006, p. 114) puts it: ‘On 
the role of mathematics, the Scottish tradition interpreted Newton’s underlying idea that 
mathematics is an instrument to describe nature, not a model of reality.’
This combination of induction and deduction is particularly evident in the Scottish 
Historical approach taken to history itself, which has been characterized as ‘analyti-
cal history’ (Skinner 1965). Historical facts themselves were organized in such a way 
as to aid analysis. Thus patterns emerging from detailed historical analysis would 
provide structure for future investigations, which in turn would suggest modifi cations 
to theory. Specifi cally, historical experience was organized into historical stages (the 
‘stadial approach’). This was of particular relevance to the development of an analysis of 
economic organization and behaviour at a time of tremendous change, notably in com-
mercialization and the mode of production addressed to expanding markets. Smith fi rst 
discussed the four historical stages in the Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762–63, 1766) (see 
further Skinner 1996, Chapter 4), identifying a diff erent mode of economic organization 
(and mode of production) within each of the four stages: hunting, pasturage, farming and 
commerce. By understanding how these stages played out in diff erent contexts (of time 
and place), Smith was able to infer some causal mechanisms at work in the development 
of civil society. Thus, the origins of property and authority are found in the fi rst two 
stages, and the connection between economic organization and the changing nature of 
subordination are found in the third and fourth stages. Further, the progression through 
the stages was seen as a natural process. The fourth stage represented progress in the 
sense that natural liberty, which had been jeopardized in earlier stages, was regained with 
commercialization. But that development could still be eroded by the encroachment of 
government, and by the alienation brought on by the increasing specialization of work 
practices, with the progressive division of labour.
While Montesquieu was an important infl uence on the emphasis placed on histori-
cal evidence, it was in Scotland, and with Smith in particular, that history was used as 
a means of identifying causes (Skinner, 1965). On the basis of natural law philosophy 
and his theory of human nature, Smith drew these causal mechanisms out from actual 
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historical experience. ‘Natural history must concern itself with the problem of change in 
those conditions within which the constant principles of human nature operate’ (Skinner, 
1965, p. 5). Change in turn was the unintended consequence of human action. This con-
trasted with the rationalist approach associated with Hobbes and Locke, whereby civil 
society was seen as developing as the result of the imposition of rational principles. 
Indeed Smith’s view was that the standards of judgement applied to analysis of historical 
episodes were relative to perspective, not the outcome of some process of pure reason.
The historical approach thus also infl uenced the way in which economic theories 
themselves were regarded, having been drawn from analysis of history. Theory itself was 
understood historically, as being developed in particular contexts to suit particular pur-
poses. How far a theory was accepted depended on what appealed to the audience of the 
time, in particular what seemed both plausible and aesthetically appealing. Thus there 
was no expectation of identifying one theory which was ‘best’ in any absolute sense, but 
rather one which was more persuasive than others in a particular context. Reality was 
too complex to be sure of identifying ‘true’ causal powers.
But, further, changing circumstances often require changing theory. Thus for example, 
while Smith’s analysis of market behaviour was expressed in terms of competitive 
markets, he did warn of the possibilities of processes which would limit competition – 
the tendency for self-interested producers to combine (WN I.viii.13). Indeed increasing 
returns would inevitably threaten the competitiveness of markets. Similarly, both Hume 
and Smith struggled to provide coherent accounts of the evolving systems of money and 
banking. Both found it diffi  cult to accept the rise in importance of inside money (bank 
notes) relative to outside money (specie) which went along with the rapid (and generally 
highly successful) expansion of banking in Scotland in the eighteenth century. But they 
were not consistent on this, at times expressing appreciation for the positive role of paper 
money, or the expansion of banking (see Murphy, 2006; Wennerlind, 2006). Hume in 
particular understood that the value attached to specie was in fact a sign of value, rather 
than purely intrinsic value. But we could look to a psychological explanation, to put 
alongside their expressed, reasoned explanations, for their anxieties about paper money. 
Hume and Smith’s own monetary theory was thus in a process of evolution in relation to 
a rapidly changing reality.
The notion of system
Implicit in the organization of historical evidence according to stages of history in 
Smith’s thought is the notion of system, that is, that there is some underlying regularity 
arising from human nature which can provide the basis for such organization. In line 
with natural law philosophy, this embodies the view that natural processes promote 
economic organization, and this organization can be understood as a system. And 
indeed it was the depiction of an economy as a system which marked out the greatness 
of Smith’s contribution, a point given great emphasis by Dugald Stewart. By providing 
a persuasive cohesive account of coordination in commercialized society, Smith was able 
to address any unease as to whether this relatively new system of economic organiza-
tion was sustainable, just as Newton had addressed unease about the sustainability of 
the solar system. Smith in turn was a great admirer of Quesnay’s system (Skinner, 1996, 
Chapter 6).
Smith built up his theory of economic organization by means of connecting principles: 
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‘Philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of nature’ (HA 45). As Loasby 
(2003) points out, a system is defi ned not only by its connections, but also crucially by its 
lack of connections. While the market provides connections, the principle of the division 
of labour provides a crucial mechanism for limiting connections. Without some limita-
tion on interconnectedness, a system cannot function (Potts, 2000). The division of labour 
segments sets of ideas, of production, and indeed of economic organization in general, so 
that they constitute systems. In Smith’s terms, a theory is an ‘imaginary machine’:
Systems in many respects resemble machines. A machine is a little system, created to perform, 
as well as to connect together, in reality, those diff erent movements and eff ects which the artist 
has occasion for. A system is an imaginary machine invented to connect together in the fancy 
those diff erent movements and eff ects which are already in reality performed. (HA 19, emphasis 
added)
This was a metaphor which he used in a variety of contexts, as for example in discuss-
ing systems of moral approbation: ‘Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain 
abstract and philosophical light, appears like a great, an immense machine, whose regular 
and harmonious movements produce a thousand agreeable eff ects’ (TMS iii.1.2).
Smith wrote about the aesthetic appeal of systems in a variety of ways which suggest 
that he himself felt their profound psychological appeal at the level of ideas. For example 
when discussing the building up of natural philosophy in ancient times, he referred to 
‘[t]he beauty of a systemical arrangement of diff erent observations connected by a few 
common principles’ (WN V.1.f). However we have seen above that he was aware of the 
dangers of seduction by aesthetic appeal, particularly of the type of formal, axiomatic, 
deductive system set out by Descartes. He warned particularly of treating intentional 
individual behaviour as being directed to market coordination, on grounds of aesthetic 
appeal of the theoretical system. He noted the tendency to ascribe causal power to 
human reason, when the consequences were in general unintended. ‘We are very apt to 
imagine that to be the wisdom of man, which in reality is the wisdom of God . . . [T]he 
system of nature seems to be more simple and agreeable when all its diff erent operations 
are in this manner deduced from a single principle’ (TMS II.ii.3.5).
Others in the tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment too, such as Sir James Steuart, 
were wary of this phenomenon, which made deductive systems more persuasive. While 
also aiming to present a system, Steuart took care to emphasize the need to tailor theory 
to context; but inevitably the outcome is less aesthetically appealing as theory. Terence 
Hutchison (1988, p. 350) concluded that Steuart’s stylistic faults were ‘brought about 
by his intellectual virtues, and by his persistent resistance to oversimplifi cation . . . It is 
easier to write clearly and engagingly when one has a simple system to expound.’
However aesthetics form only one element of persuasion. It is deductivist theory which 
appears to perform best on aesthetic grounds. But, particularly within a context where 
practical application (in such wide-ranging contexts as moral behaviour and mechanics) 
was seen as the purpose of knowledge, grounding in reality was also signifi cant for per-
suasion. Thus, while Smith saw the aesthetic appeal of Descartes’s purely abstract expla-
nation for planetary motion, he found Newton’s explanation more persuasive, based as 
it was on his experimental philosophy. Indeed Smith saw the persuasive role of ground-
ing in reality more important for moral philosophy (including economic questions) than 
for natural philosophy. In his writing on rhetoric, Smith emphasized the  persuasive 
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 importance of connecting arguments to what is already accepted by the audience as 
knowledge. Persuasion required the explanation to be plausible to an audience who had 
direct experience of moral life (including commercial activity). It was less likely, by impli-
cation, that a purely abstract explanation of economic behaviour, however aesthetically 
appealing, would persuade an audience as readily as a purely abstract  explanation of 
something of which the audience did not have direct experience.
Nevertheless, in weighing up aesthetics relative to grounding in experience, the persua-
sive power of a theoretical system would suff er if the system required ad hoc adjustments 
in order to maintain consistency with experience (Skinner, 1972). Where the prevailing 
theoretical system fails satisfactorily to explain new anomalies other than by ad hoc 
adjustment, there is a strong motivation to develop a new explanatory system. Here we 
fi nd Smith anticipating Lakatos as well as Kuhn.
The nature and role of principles
How we understand Smith’s notion of system depends in turn very much on how we 
understand the nature and role of principles, and here again we see the infl uence of 
Newton. Given Smith’s explicit debt to Newton’s methodology, Newton’s principle 
of gravitation can be interpreted in the same way as Smith’s principle of the division 
of labour, in relation to their respective systems. But how these systems in turn are 
 interpreted depends on what is meant by a principle, and requires further exploration.
In the natural sciences literal experimentation is possible (in the sense of constructing 
a closed system for the purpose of isolating a causal mechanism). But for Smith (and 
Hume), experimentation took the form of historical observation of concrete episodes, 
out of which emerged principles which could then be considered for their explanatory 
power in other historical contexts. And both considered themselves as aiming to establish 
the ‘unchanging principles’ of human nature, which would provide the foundation of all 
knowledge. These principles refer to the human faculties, as Hume and Smith identifi ed 
them: the passions, imagination (and thus sympathy), observation and reason. Thus, for 
example, Smith discussed ‘the Principle of Self-approbation and of Self-disapprobation’, 
such that sympathy meant that the reason for self-approbation accorded with the reason 
for our approval of others (TMS III.1).
In economics, the principle of the division of labour is the core on which his theoretical 
system is built. In accordance with the Newtonian methodology for formulating theory, 
this principle was the outcome of Smith’s identifi cation of a pattern from his detailed 
studies of history, and observation of economic life. In communicating this principle, 
like his principles of moral life, Smith (in accordance with his own principles of rhetoric) 
expressed them in terms of familiar examples, as well as using examples from history. 
The rhetorical power of the pin factory metaphor, with which Smith begins the Wealth 
of Nations, is attested to by the way in which it has stuck in the collective imagination. 
Later examples from older or remoter contexts served to illustrate the generality of the 
principle, often in intriguing ways.
Smith thus starts the exposition of his system with the principle. In Smith’s own words:
in the manner of Sir Isaac Newton we may lay down certain principles known or proved in 
the beginning, from whence we count for the severall Phenomena, connecting all together by 
the same Chain. This latter which we may call the Newtonian method is undoubtedly the most 
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Philosophical, and in every science whether of Moralls or Natural Philosophy etc., is vastly 
more ingenious and for that reason more engaging than the other [Aristotle’s]. (LRBL 145–6).
But if we take Smith’s philosophy of science seriously, then we must take it that 
the principle of the division of labour is, like the principle of gravity, an appeal to the 
imagination rather than a ‘real’ phenomenon. For Newton, the principles on which the 
analysis is based were previously derived using the experimental method, and are thus 
provisional (Montes, 2006).
For Descartes, however, the principles on which analysis is based are axioms which, 
as in cogito, ergo sum, are arrived at through contemplation aided by classical logic. 
Because Descartes takes his axioms as true, the conclusions arrived at by applying 
deductive logic to the axioms were also true. Smith’s principles of human nature were 
quite diff erent. They were established by the ‘experimental method’, which involved 
detailed study of history. Further, for Smith, the principles appealed to the imagination 
as a way of explaining the diversity of human behaviour in diff erent contexts in time and 
space. This diversity could be systematized according to the stages approach to history. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis was on the diff erent forms which human behaviour can take, 
in spite of the unchanging principles of human nature. This approach is particularly 
understandable when we take account of Smith’s social environment, where Highlanders 
could be classed as savages, and Scots were working alongside aboriginal peoples in 
North America.
Similarly the principle of the division of labour can be thought of as a way of organ-
izing thought about causal powers at work in commercialized society. This is quite dif-
ferent from the role of an axiom in classical logic. We have seen that Smith was quite 
explicit that, while it is appealing to explain human behaviour in terms of deduction from 
one principle (referring only to human reason), this does not refl ect the basis for human 
behaviour more in the passions than reason. While a rationalist account of society lends 
itself to a deductive axiomatic system, the more complex Scottish account of human 
behaviour, its determinants and its consequences, all referring to the particularities of 
the context in relation to the historical system, cannot be captured in a deductive system. 
In any case, the method of applying principles to new contexts might always lead to an 
evolution of theory, and thus a new mode of expression of the principles. Indeed, John 
Rae made exactly that argument in proposing that Smith’s principle of the division of 
labour started too far along the causal chain. Rae argued instead that the division of 
labour followed from the human capacity for invention, so that that should provide the 
starting point (Mair, 2006).
The only common element, therefore, between the deductivist methodology of the 
French Enlightenment and the ‘experimental’ approach of the Scottish Enlightenment 
was that axioms in the fi rst and principles in the second held a special place as the basis 
for deductive reasoning. There the similarity ended. While axioms are ‘self-evidently true’ 
by introspection, principles are derived from detailed observation. While the deduction 
of propositions from the axioms was the end of the matter for the deductivist approach, 
this was only one further step for the experimental approach, requiring also adaptation 
to the observed characteristics of the domain of application, with the possibility always 
of revision of principles. Smith’s system ultimately was a mental construct designed for 
psychological appeal, but also for plausibility in the light of experience.
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Nevertheless an experimental system might be expressed in an abstract form similar 
to a deductivist system (albeit communicated with a wealth of examples from history, 
of daily experience). Smith had noted the aesthetic appeal of an axiomatic system. But, 
as Skinner (1996, p. 21) has noted, Smith also distinguished between the formulation of 
theory (by the experimental method) and its communication (which started with prin-
ciples), while the deductivist approach is the same in formulation as in communication, 
that is, by means of deductive logic.
It could be argued that this is an important factor in understanding later interpreta-
tions of Smith as inspiring general equilibrium theory. Smith’s infl uence was so great 
because he off ered such an appealing system, based on common principles of humanity. 
From a deductivist perspective, it was natural to confuse principles with axioms, and to 
confuse Smith’s rhetorical system as being the sum total of his theory (rather than the 
outcome of application of the experimental method). This involved ignoring Smith’s 
ideas on rhetoric, and the psychology of science, as well as the implications of his princi-
ples of human nature for how economic behaviour should be depicted. It is not uncom-
mon for an idea developed within one methodology to inspire new developments within 
another methodology. Indeed this is evidence of exactly the kind of connecting principle 
which Smith himself had seen as the core of new knowledge. Nevertheless the outcome 
was very diff erent from Smith’s own system.
Conclusion
We have seen that Smith’s methodology took much of its distinctiveness from the phi-
losophy of the Scottish Enlightenment. Yet, in his hands, that philosophy allowed the 
building of a system of social science which was so masterful that Smith became com-
monly regarded as the father of economics. It was his capacity for analytical history 
which allowed him to build up a theory of human nature and apply that to formulate 
a theory of the social system. By attempting to explain the workings of commercial 
society in comparison with earlier stages, Smith’s system provided an account of market 
 behavior which drew on his understanding of human nature.
It is now conventional to note the disparity between Smith’s system and references 
to it as the origin of general equilibrium theory. We have seen that this disparity can 
be understood in terms of the methodological diff erences between Smith’s approach 
and the deductivism of general equilibrium theory. It has also proved important to be 
aware of Smith’s distinction between the principles of discourse, where elegance and 
simplicity persuade, on the one hand, and the principles of scientifi c enquiry, on the 
other. Perhaps the way in which Smith’s system was developed by others along deduc-
tivist lines can be understood partly as the result of later economists not taking this 
distinction on board. But this was just one consequence of discounting the signifi cance 
of Smith’s alternative methodology. That methodology in turn was founded on his 
theory of human nature, and its consequences both for economic theorizing and for 
the behaviour of economic agents. Consistent with that theory, the eff ect of Smith’s 
ideas was unlikely to be what he had intended. As Hutchison (1988, p. 355) has noted, 
the unintended consequence of Smith’s work was to establish political economy ‘as a 
separate autonomous discipline’.
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